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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
UTAH SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, ) 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES D. NUNLEY and MARY V. NUNLEY, \ 
his wife, et al, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
/ 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
CASE 
NO. 
10451 
This is an action to foreclose four trust deeds in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for Sum-
mary Judgment against the defendants, James [). Nun-
ley and Mary V. Nunley, his wife. The default of the re-
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maining defendants had previously been entered. The 
trial court thereafter signed and filed its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Foreclosure, includ-
ing in said Findings and Conclusions a determination that 
$10,000.00 was a reasonable sum to be awarded the plain-
tiff as an attorney's fee and granting judgment against 
the defendants, Nunley, therefor. From that portioo of 
the Decree awarding the attorney fee, the defendants, Nun-
ley, have appealed. 
RELIEI, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants, Nunley, seek reversal of that portion of 
the Decree of Foreclosure permitting plaintiff an attor-
ney's fee, and seek judgment in respect thereto in their 
favor as a matter of law, and for costs of this appeal. De-
fendants, Nunley, fiurther request that this court remand 
this case to the court below for further hearing to deter-
mine whether there was a deficiency or surplus monies 
resulting from the Sheriff's foreclosure sale, consistent 
with the opinion sought from this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except in certain significant particulars, the respond-
ent agrees substantially with the appellants' statement of 
facts. Because of the significance of those particulars 
which are either omitted completely, or are vaguely stated 
by the appellants, however, a recital of tlhe facts by the re-
spondent is considered neces.sary. 
This action was instituted _by the plaintiff for the pur· 
pose of foreclosing four separate deeds of trust on four 
separate tracts of land in the same manner provided for 
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the foreclosure of mortgages on real property, pursuant to 
the laws of this state. Included in the prayer for relief in 
each cause of action, was a demand for judgment for a 
reasonable attorney's fee for the prosecution of the action. 
The notes secured by the four individual deeds of trust 
were each of a principal amount of $35,000.00 and con-
tained provisions for the payment of interest and costs and 
expenses of collection, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee (R 1-37). The aggregate amount owing on the four 
obligations as of the date of entry of judgment of fore. 
closure was $141, 212.03, plus delinquent reserves for taxes 
and insurance on said premises in the further sum of 
$522.03. 
After service of process upon them, tlhe defendants, 
Nunley, filed and noticed for hearing in Salt Lake City, 
two separate motions-one to quash service of summons 
on Mary V. Nunley, and one to dismiss plaintiff's com-
plaint for failure to join indispensable parties (R 41-45). 
These motions, of course, necessitated considerable brief-
ing and appearance by counsel for plaintiff, involving a 
trip from Provo, Utah, to Salt Lake City. Said appear-
ance wa.s in fact made on June 15, 1965, and arguments 
were presented to the same judge who thereafter heard 
and ruled upon plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment, 
and who signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree from which tms appeal has been taken. 
Plaintiff's counsel was successful in his opposition to said 
motions and they were overruled and denied by the trial 
court and the defendants were given ten days in w!hich to 
answer plaintiff's complaint. 
Defendants, James D. Nunley and Mary V. Nunley, 
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his wife, interposed their answer to the plaintiff's com-
plaint thirteen days later, on the 28th day of June, 1965, 
and , among other things, denied all the allegations con-
tained in the plaintiff's complaint, thus putting at issue 
the question of whether or not plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment against said defendants for a reasonable attor. 
ney's fee but not presenting any issue of fact as to what 
constituted a "reasonable" fee. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff, by formal motion, in writing, 
moved the trial court for Summary Judgment against the 
defendants, Nunley, (R 49-57) and submitted in support 
thereof the affidavit of J. Cdllin Allan, Vice-President of 
plaintiff corporation. The affidavit was appropriately re-
ceived by the court below and served to establish the au-
thenticity of the deeds of trust and promissory notes in 
question and the amounts and legality of the obligations 
represented thereby, as well, among other things, as the 
entitlement of the plaintifif to judgment against the def end· 
ants, Nunley, for a reasonable attorney's fee. Said affi. 
davit was not controverted by the defendants, Nunley. 
Pursuant to plaintiff's notice, counsel for the plain· 
tiff and for 1lhe defendants, Nunley, appeared in Salt Lake 
City, on July 19, 1965, and present.eel their arguments in 
support of and opposition to the motion for Summary Judg-
ment (R 49-50). After hearing oral arguments of coon· 
sel for the parties to this appeal, the court asked both 
counsel if the motion was then submitted (R 80). Both 
counsel then affirmatively indicated that it was and the 
court promptly ruled from the bench in favor of the plain· 
tiff and granted plaintiff's motion. Immediately following 
the court's ruling on the motion, ·counsel for the defend· 
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ants, Nunley, departed from the courtroom without rais-
ing any issue whatever as to what constituted a "reason-
able" attorney's fee to be awarded plaintiff according to 
the prayer of its complaint. Counsel for the plaintiff, at 
the same time, approached the bench and inquired of the 
District Judge as to what amount the court would con-
sider reasonable as an attorney's fee in said cause. The 
court then inquired of counsel as to what amount he con-
sidered to be a reasonable fee, whereupon, counsel advised 
the court that under the minimum fee schedule of the Utah 
State Bar and considering the amount involved and the 
work expended in connection with the foreclosure, a fee 
of $2500.00 for each cause of action, or a total fee of 
$10,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the services of coun-
sel in the premises. The court then instructed counsel to 
prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and De.-
cree accordingly, (Supp. R) . Pursuant to this instruc-
tion, counsel for the plaintiff prepared and, oo July 21, 
1965, the court signed and filed Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law providing, among other things, as follows: 
"That said promissory notes and deeds of trust, and 
each and all of them, provide that the makers thereof 
will pay a reasonable attorney's fee in the event of 
default in the payment of said indebtedness. That it 
has become and is necessary for the plaintiff to em-
ploy counsel to prosecute this action and to foreclose 
said deeds of trust, as mortgages. That the reason-
able value of the services of counsel in this action is 
as follows: 
=='--- ------------
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First Cause of Action $ 2,500.00 
Second Cause of Action $ 2,500.00 
Third Cause of Action $ 2,500.00 
Fourth Cause of Action $ 2,500.00 
Total $10,000.00 
As Coo.clusions of Law firom the foregoing Findings 
of Fact, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to 
an attorney's fee in the amount of $2500.00 for each cause 
of action, or a total fee of $10,000.00, plus its costs of suit 
expended in said cause. On the same date the court signed 
and filed its Decree of Foreclosure in said cause and en· 
tered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendants, Nunley, for an attorney's fee in the amount 
of $2500.00 for each cause of action, or the aggregate sum 
of $10,000.00 (R 58-70). 
The defendants, Nunley, at no time after the entry 
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and De-
cree by the court, as aforesaid, mo¥ed the court, pursuant 
to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proicedure, for a new 
trial or to open the judgment, take additional testimony, 
amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or 
to make new Findings and Conclusions and direct the en· 
try of a new judgment for any irregularity in the proceed· 
ings or for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the de-
cision. Further, although counsel for the defendants, Nun· 
ley, was present in court on the 19th day of July, 1965, 
when Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the 
plaintiff, he demonstrated no interest whatever in the ques· 
ti.an of what constituted a reasonable attorney's fee or in 
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the characte2· or regularity of the evidence elicited by the 
court in determining that question, and made no objection 
whatever to such evidence, but on the contrary, immedi-
ately departed from the courtroom upon the announce-
ment of the court's decision. The first and only dissatis-
taction of the defendants, Nunley, with the court's decision 
respecting attorney's fees and the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the court's findings relating thereto was 
expressed by the defendants' pending appeal to this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COURT TO SUSTAIN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE RE-
SPECTING THE AWARD OF A'ITORNEY'S FEES TO 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
The pleadings of the defendants, Nunley, did not 
frame any issue as to what was or was not a "reasonable" 
attorney's fee. The only issue presented by the plead .. 
ings with respect to attorneys fees was the question of 
whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to judgment 
for a reasonable attorney's fee against the said defend-
ants. The notes and the four individual deeds of trust 
by which the notes were secured contained p~ovisions for 
the payment of expenses of collection, including a reason-
able attorney's fee (R 1-37). The affidavit of J. Collin 
Allan, Vice-President of plaintiff corporation, filed in sup-
port of the plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment and 
appropriately received by the court below served to estab-
lish, among other things, the entitlement of the plaintiri' 
to judgment against the defendants, Nunley, for a reason. 
able attorney's fee. The saic:i affidavit was Jt:ot c:ontro. 
verted by the defendants, Nunley, and for this reason was 
suflf.icient in law to establish the plainti.l.f's right to the re. 
lief demanded in the p:tayer of the plaintiff's complaint, in-
cluding the award of a reasonable attorney's fee, and the 
court so found. 
Neither the defendants, Nunley, nor their counsel, at 
any time, manifested any interest in the question of what 
constituted a ":reasonable" attorney's fee, and did not, at 
any time, frame their pleadings in such way as to m<ike 
this precise question an issue in the case. They were only 
concerned with the question of whetheT or not the plain· 
tiff was entitled to any attorney's fee whatever. 
It should be noted from the statement of facts that 
the same judge who made the determination of the amount 
of the attorney's fee awarded to the plaintiff and signed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, accordingly, also 
heard, considered, and passed upon the said defendants' 
motion to quash service of sununons on Mary V. Nunley; 
the said defendants' motion to dismis8 the plaintiff's com· 
plaint for failure to join indispensable parties; and the 
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment. He had before 
him the entire file of the case including all exhibits and 
affida'Vits received in evidence, by which pleadings no issue 
of fact was presented pertaining to the precise question of 
what constituted a "reasonable" attorney's fee. He was 
aware of the am0W1t involved in the proceeding, Which ex· 
ceeded $141,000.00; he was acquainted with counsel for all 
the parties and familiar with their reputations in the pro-
fession; he \vas av,rare of and capable of evaluating the 
complexities of the issues involved in the case and of the 
performance of counsel in resolving those issues by virtue 
of havir.g presided at hearings on three separate motions 
before him. He was certainly cognizant of the minimwn 
fee schedule recommended by the Utah State Bar Associ-
ation and was not without experience in fixing fees in sitn-
ilar cases. In addition, he elicited, received, and considered 
the statements of counsel for the plaintiff to the effect 
that under the minimum fee schedule of the Utah State 
Bar and considering the amount involved in the suit and 
the work entailed in connection therewith it was counsel's 
opinion that the sum of $-2500.00 for each cause of &C'tliQR, 
or a total fee of $10,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the 
services of counsel in the action . Although these state-
ments were not given under oath, neither were -they ob-
jectro ro nor challenged for regularity by 'COUl1Sel 1ior said 
defendants either at the time they were given or by way 
of a motion for a new trial. 
This court, in the reported case of F .M.A. ,Finanoia'I 
Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.ac .2d 6:70, 
referred to in appellants' brief, ,acknowledged that wider 
certain circwnstances the €'\'idence required to establish 
an attmney's fee neied not be proved by sworn testimony 
"because both judges and lawyers have special .knowledge 
as to the value of legal services." It is submitted that 
where the defendants have failed to make any issue by 
their pleadings of what constitutes a "reasonahle" attor-
ney's fee and by displaying no interest whatever in the de-
termination of that question by departing from the court-
room when the very question is being presented far deter-
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mination, and by failing to object to the character or qual-
ity or sufficiency of the evidence presented and considered 
on that behalf, they have rendered the detennination of 
the question by the cotui on the basis of the factors within 
his knowledge unobjectionable. Stipulation of the parties 
is not the exclusive basis upon which such evidence may be 
properly considered. 
The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert 
on tile question of the value orf legal services, and may con-
sider its own knowledge and experience concerning rea-
sonable and proper fees and may form an independent 
judgment either- with or without the aid of testimony of 
witnesses as to value. (Campbell v. Green, 112 F 2d 143; 
Adams v. Brothers, 155 Kan 23, 122 Piac 2d 757; Johnson 
v. Howard, 167 Mi~. 475, 141 So 573; Gulf Paving Com-
pany v. Lofstedt, 144 Tex 17, 188 SW 2d 155). 
The trial court has wide discretion in awarding attor-
ney's fees to a prevailing party and the appellate court 
should not disturb such award in the absence of a manifest 
abuse of discretion._ (In re Smith's Estate, 162 Pac 2d 105, 
108 Utaih 537). 
In tJhe reported case of Mann v. Mann, 172 Pac 2d 369, 
76 C. A. 2d 32, the court held that where a note sued on 
provides for the payment of a reasonable attorney's fee, 
the trial court may fix the amount thereof in its discretion, 
without the introduction of direct evidence on the matter 
and the ruling will be reversed on appeal only for abuse 
of discretion. To the same effect are the reported cases 
of Crocker v. Crocker First National Bank of San Fran-
cisco, 141 Pac 2d 482, 60 C. A. 2d 725; Sattinger v. Golden 
State Glass Corporation, 127 Pac 2d 653, 53 C. A. 2d 133; 
11 
Elsea v. Br~me .Furniture Company, 143 Pac 2d 572, 47 
N. M. 346; and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Com-
pany v. Charles H. Lilly Company, 286 Pac 2d 107. 
The circumstances attendant upon the case now pend-
ing before this court are more in harmony with the cases 
last a:bove cited than with the fact situation in the reported 
casei of F. M. A. Financial CorporatiQD. v. Build, Ine., 
wherein a different result was reached. 
POINT II 
TIIE QUESTION OF REASONABLENESS OF THE 
ATI'ORNEY'S FEE AWARDED TO THIE PLAINTIFF IN 
THE COURT BELOW IS NOT REVIEW ABLE BY THIS 
COURT. 
The record clearly discloses that no issue was ever 
raised by the defendants, Nunley, in their plea.dings, as to 
the question of what amount constituted a "reasonable" 
attorney's fee. The court found, on the basis of the plead-
ings, exhibits, and affidavit of J. Collin Allan, the Vice-. 
President of plaintiff corporation, which affidavit was Wl-
controverted, that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee. This decision resolved the only issue framed 
by the defendants' pleadings with respect to the award of 
an attorney's fee. While the evidence received and con-
sidered by the court in the form of an unsworn statement 
by counsel for the plaintiff expressing his professional opin-
ion as to the value of the services rendered might have 
been properly objected to at the time it was given, if coun-
sel for said defendants had been inclined to raise such ob-
jection, this was not done and it cannot be said, therefore, 
that the court did not have before it evidence of the value 
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of the legal services in addition to that knowledge and ex-
perience already possessed by the 1court. Further, the said 
defendants made no attempt, prior to initiating this ap-
peal, to present objections to the court's finding on this 
subject or to challenge the regularity of the proceeding 
wherein the court made its determination, or to challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, all 
as permitted by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules orf Civil Pro-
cedtITe. The employment of a motion for a new trial un-
der the foregoing rule would have permitted the trial court 
to open the judgment and take additional testimony, if he 
thought it necessary, and to amend the Findings of Fact 
and Condtisions -Of Law or to make new Findings and Con-
clusions and to direct the entry of a new judgment on the 
is.sue of attorney's fees. 
This court has made it a:bundantly clear that by fail· 
ing to raise the objection and except to the rulings of the 
trial court at the time of trial and also by failing to move 
the court for a new trial because of irregularity in the pro-
ceedings of the court oc the insufficiency of the evidence 
to justify the award of the attorney's fee which was an 
~ue upon which the trial court was not given the oppor-
tunity to rule otherwise, the appellant cannot now obtain 
a review of the identical question by this court. 
The landmark case in this state on this question is 
Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac 300, wherein the court 
said: 
"A motion for a new trial does not enlarge the mat· 
ters that may be reviewed by this court, except upon 
matters which the trial court could not, and did not. 
pass on at the trial. These are specified in Section 
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3292, and, in brief, are: (1) Irregularity in the proceed-
ing of the court*** and (6) the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify the verdict. In granting or refusing 
the motion, the trial court may exercise a sound dis-
cn.ition which the losing party may invoke in the light 
of the wlhole proceedings in the case. This court can-
not exercise such discretion, but is ordinarily limited 
to the review of specific rulings made by the trial 
<..."'Ourt. * * * * If the trial court has passed upon a matter 
in the course of a trial and an exception is taken or 
is given by the statute, the ruling or decision made by 
the trial court, if assigned as error, is before this court 
for review on appeal If, therefore, a matter comes 
up after the trial, or where some irreguladty in the 
proceedings during the trial, or some of the matters 
arise which are enumerated in the first five grounds 
for a new trial to which we have directed attention, 
they mUFt be brought to the attention of the trial 
court by a motion for a new trial, and his ruling upon 
them may then be- reviewed by this court. They can-
not be reviewed otherwise, since the trial court can-
not pass upon them except in passing on a motion for 
a new trial." 
The Utah case of Foxley v. Gallagher, reported in 185 
Pac 775, followed with approval the case of Law v. Smith 
and specifically applied that decision to a situation where 
the appellant raises for the first time, on appeal, the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judg-
ment. The respondent in that case contended that the 
appellant was obliged to move the trial court for a new 
trial as a condition precedent to prosecuting his appeal 
even tlhough the appellant had, in fact, moved the court 
for a directed verdict. This court took the position that 
if the appellant had already moved the trial court for a 
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directed verdict, it was not necessary for him to require 
the trial court to repeat its error by ruling again on the 
same question in a motion for new trial. Significantly, 
however, the court went on to say: 
"If, however, after failing to move for a directed ver-
dict, appellants had also failed to move for a new 
trial on the grounds mentioned, respondent's conten-
tion would have been correct and amply sustained by 
many of the authorities cited." 
The court went on to quote from the opinion in the 
case of Law v. Smith as follows: 
"So, likewise, in case a party desires to challenge the 
verdict of a jury upon the groWld that the verdict is 
not sustained by the evidence, he must do so by a 
motion for a new trial, w1.less during the trial he 
raised the legal question involved by a motion for a 
non suit or for a directed verdict. Unless he has pre-
sented either a motion for a non suit or for a directed 
verdict, the trial court has had no opportunity to pass 
upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence during tltc 
trial, and cannot do so w1.less a motion for a new trial 
upon tlhe ground of the insufficiency of the evidence 
is presented to it. When, howev·2r, a motion for a 
non suit or a motion for a directed verdict has been 
made and ruled upon, the court has had the oppor· 
tunity to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evi· 
dence precisely the same as upon a motion for a. n.:"' 
trial, and hence the latter motion, for the purposes 
of a review, may be dispensed with. In this way all 
the orders, rulings, and decisions of the trial court. 
whether made during the trial or on motion for a new 
trial, can be brought before this court for review, and 
on all of them the court need to pass judgment but 
once. •••" 
e 
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In quoting the above portion of the decision in Law 
v. Smith, the court, in Foxley v. Gallagher, approved the 
foregoing language as follows: 
"It is not necessary to interpose any explanation as to 
the meaning of the language quoted. It is self-ex-
planatory, and in the opinion of the writer effectually 
determines the law of this jurisdiction upon 1Jhe point 
in question . The decision in that case is clearly de-
cisive of the question presented here, and as the court 
as now constituted is in hearty accord with both the 
conclusions reached and the reasons given therefor, 
we feel both legally and morally bound to adopt the 
rule there laid down as controlling in the case at bar." 
Under the fact situation in tihe instant case, the issue 
of the sufficiency of the evidence as to what constitutes a 
"reasonable" attorney's fee was never raised by the de-
fendants. Nunley, nor ruled upon by the trial court and a 
ruling on that question c'OUld only have ·been made by the 
defendants presenting a motion for a new trial, which they 
did not do. Since this question has not been raised by said 
defendants, and then considered and ruled upon by the 
COUI"t below, it is not now subject to review by this court. 
POINT III 
IF THIS COURT, CONTRARY TO RESPONiDENT'S 
CONTENTIONS, SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE COURT BELOW IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE ON 
THE QUESTION OF THE AMOUNT OF THE ATTOR-
NEY'S FEE, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO 
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THE COURT BELOW TO RECEIVE A[)DITIONAL EVI. 
DENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. 
The appellants have never challenged the ruling of 
the trial court granting plaintiff's motion for Summary 
Judgment aginst the defendants, Nunley. The trial court 
had before it, as items of evidence, copies of notes and 
deeds of trust which appellants admit, in their brief, con-
tained provisions for the payment of costs and expenses of 
collection, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The affi. 
davit of J. Collin Allan, Vice-President of plaintiff corpo. 
ration, established plaintiff's entitlement to a reasonable 
attorney's fee and said affidavit was not controverted by 
the defendants, Nunley. The only question, therefore, for 
the trial court to decide was what constituted a "reason-
able" attorney's fee in the cause. The statement of plain-
tiff's counsel of his opinion as to what constituted a rea-
sonable fee in the premises, given to the court without 
objection, is in this record. If that evidence, coupled with 
the peculiar knowledge and experience of the trial judge 
and his acquaintance with counsel, his familiarity with the 
case and the performance of counsel in connection with 
rulings on three separate motions before him, and his 
knowledge of the recommendations of the Utah State Bar 
Association relating to minimum fees is considered insuf-
ficient to support his Findings and Conclusions and De-
cree awarding to the plaintiff judgment for an attorney's 
fee in the aggregate sum of $10,000.00, then this case should 
be remanded to the court below for the taking of adcli· 
tional evidence and the entry of amended or new Findings 
and Conclusions and Decree relating thereto. Where the 
evidence in an equity case is too indefinite to support the 
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findings of the trial court, the cause will be ,rem.anded to 
th(' trial court to take further testimony and the findings 
will be set aside. Elliot v. Whitmore, 8 Utah 253, 30 P 
984. 
To this same effect is the case of Mason v. Ma.son, 160 
Pac 2d 730, cited in appellants' brief, as well as in the re-
ported case of Jensen v. lichtenstein, 143 Pac 1036, where-
in this court remanded the cause to the court below: 
uo•to hear any competent evidence the parties, or 
either of them, may offer upon the question of What 
amoont should be fixed in this case as a reasonable 
fee, and, after hearing such evidence, or any other 
competent evidence upon that subject that the court 
may call for on its own motion, to fix a reasona:ble 
sum as an attorney's fee••••" 
The court in the foregoing case also made this signi-
ficant observation: 
"The trial courts, in each Q'i.Se, become familiar with 
all the issues, know just what the facts and circum-
stances developed at the hearing are, and thus are in 
a position to arrive at an intelligent and just condu-
s' 1Ja re~3'jJ:Xting the amount that should be allowed as 
the reasonable fee contemplated by our statutes. In 
case, howeveT, the court has insufficient data upon 
which to base a finding, or even though he has such 
data, he may nevertheless, as pointed out ·in Kurtz v. 
Sanitarium Company, 37 Utah 313, 108 Pac 14, call 
to his assistance attorneys engaged in the practice and 
take their judgment under oath respecting the amount 
that would be reasonable in any given case." 
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CONCLUSION 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
appellant, the conclusion is inescapable (1) that sufficient 
evidence was adduced at the trial, which when ooupk<l 
with the knowledge and experience of the court and his 
participation in all stages of the prnceeding, was sufficient 
to support and sustain the Findings and Conclusions and 
Decree respecting the attorney's fee. (2) By appeUants' 
failing to move the court below for a new trial upon the 
grounds of irregularity in the proceedings below or the in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the 
court, the trial court was denied the opportunity to rule 
upon the precise question now before this court on appeal 
and under such circumstances that question is not now 
subject to review by this court. ( 3) If this court, for any 
reason should conclude (a) that the question presented by 
this appeal is properly before this court for review and (bl 
that the evidence upon which the trial judge made his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered his 
Decree awarding judgment to the plaintiff for a reasonable 
attorney's fee, was legally insufficient, then the matter 
should be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of 
receiving additional evidence on this subject. 
Costs should be awarded to the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON 
By V. PERSHING NELSON 
35 North University A venue 
Provo, Utah 
Cowisel for Respondent 
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